

Macondoutblåsningen i et Regelverksperspektiv

ESRA Norge - 7. april i Stavanger: Brønnintegritet og utblåsningsrisiko

Lars Tore Haug 2011-04-01



Content

- Consequences of major accidents regulatory response
- Deepwater Horizon a new game changer?
- Vision Step Change Improvement for Major Accidents
- Some ongoing changes in the regulations



Recap – Why Are We Here?

- April 20, 2010 About 21:45 local time, gas under high pressure flows uncontrolled up from the Macondo well onto the rig Deepwater Horizon. The gas ignited, resulting in fires and explosions. The rig is a total loss.
- 11 fatalities and 17 injured
- Oil leakage:
 - From April 20 July 15 (well capped)
 - US experts suggest initial rate was 63,000 b/d declining to 53,000 b/d (4.9m bbls in total)
- Static and final bottom kill successful
- Largest oil spill event in US history
- Many countries, NGO's and stakeholders call for more regulation of the industry.





Consequences of major accidents – regulatory response


NEW REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

- Alexander Kielland Structural redundancy
- Exxon Valdez Double hulls
 RISK METHODOLOGY
- Bhopal & Seveso Seveso directive
- Piper Alpha "Safety Case"
- Texas City increased safety for process industry CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER
- Herald of Free Enterprise
- Scandinavian Star

NEW REGULATORY BODIES

- Flixborough HSC in UK, HSWA
- Piper Alpha UK HSE now extended to offshore
 FINANCE
- Enron Sarbanes-Oxley

MACONDO and MONTARA BLOWOUT ?????





Deepwater Horizon – a new game changer?

- Yes we are facing a loss of confidence in the industry, with significant impact.
- Several severe incidents the last 2 years contribute
 - Montara blow-out in Australia
 - Aban Pearl semi lost offshore Venezuela
 - Gullfaks C loss of barriers
- Why is this one significant?
 - Scale largest oil spill ever x 2
 - Location USA + elections + mass media
 - In the new social media age, there is nowhere to hide
 - Company involved (BP, a major 'foreign' IOC to the Americans, with a poor track record in the USA)

All contribute to make Deepwater Horizon a game changer!







Vision – Step Change Improvement for Major Accidents

DNV believes major accidents can also be reduced 10x – via an integrated approach

- 1. Revised regulatory regime: Blend of Prescriptive and Performance-based regulations
- 2. Address technical, human and organizational factors: Key lessons from past accidents, think about barriers
- 3. Enhanced and enforced risk management approach: Addressing Risks, Controls and Condition through the lifecycle
- 4. Clear roles and responsibilities: Clear to all, and reinforced through an effective culture
- 5. Shared performance monitoring: All information is readily available when and where needed, and recognised for its significance

DNV believes:

- This is practically and economically feasible
- Methods described are in use but not fully integrated
- Skills and experience available in the regulator, industry, contractors, and 3rd parties



What the Oil & Gas Industry has and has not achieved

- Over the last 20 years the industry has attained a **step change** (factor of ten) improvement in occupational safety
 - Graph shows factor of 3 in last 10 years

USA and EU Process Industry


- Neither EU nor USA has demonstrated significant improvements for onshore major accidents (OSHA PSM, EU Seveso Directive)
- Chemical Safety Board and Baker Panel highlighted after Texas City that Process Safety (major accidents) and Occupational Safety (personal accidents) are NOT the same


 \checkmark

X

North Sea major accident safety has improved

- No major disaster since introduction of Safety Case / risk based legislation in UK / Norway (leaks have occurred, but none escalated)
- Reducing trend in major hydrocarbon leaks
 - Factor of 10 in last 13 years UK HSE Database
 - "What doesn't leak can't explode ... "







Macondoutblåsningen i et Regelverksperspektiv 2011-04-01 © Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.

How do we improve regulations?

- 1) By having a "instant" reaction and issuing regulations specifically targeted at the event that has happened?
- 2) By setting prescriptive regulations directed at the last incident?
- 3) By more effective implementation of what we already have?
- By understanding the root causes of an incident, and engaging the industry in identifying ways to avoid accidents which present risks to Safety, Environment and Profitability
- 5) By requiring operators to demonstrate to stakeholders (not just regulators) how they will design, operate and decommission their facilities in a safe and environmentally responsible manner
- 6) By setting improvement goals for the industry, and verifying how they are achieving those goals.



Reaction and Reflection





Key regulatory regime differences (USA and EU)

- The EU regulations are mainly performance-based
- The U.S. regulations are primarily prescriptive
- The intention with a performance-based regime is to make the operator regulate its own activities when it comes to safety, health and environment (SHE)
- The intention with prescriptive regulations is to prevent accidents by identifying specific technical requirements that the **operator must comply** with. The Authorities control the operator's activity through approvals and inspections.
- DNV's experience is that performance based (goal setting) regimes backed by independent verification of key barriers are the most effective.



Step Change – How can this be achieved?

Prevention:

- 1. Understand all failure modes, their risks, and needed controls for "Step-Change"
 - More sensitivity studies and "what if" analyses. Don't assume in risk assessment that barriers are infallible
 - Demonstrate how improvement is achievable through design and operational controls
 - Remember the human element when identifying failure potential (including in decision making)
- 2. Identify and monitor the status of all barriers throughout life
 - Better barrier models with continuous status updating and effective communications
 - Degraded barriers must be addressed, and fed back into risk assessments
 - Improved knowledge of equipment failure frequencies share more data in the industry
- 3. Fully comply with Regulatory and Company requirements
 - Exemplary Conduct of Operations and Operational Discipline
 - Oilfield Teamwork (offshore + shore-based staff) solving problems and monitoring actions

Mitigation:

- 4. Demonstrate effective mitigation strategies to deal with major or catastrophic oil spill events
- 5. Demonstrate effective response strategies to contain, capture and dispose of oil safely



1. Revised Regulatory Regime

Blend of Prescriptive and Performance-based regulations

- The industry has deep knowledge of hazards and risk management
 - New processes or new development approaches can however introduce novel hazards
 - Industry can carry out risk assessments, define necessary controls and monitor conditions
 - The Operator must carry the responsibility for proper Safety and Environmental protection
- Authorities / government agencies have specialist manpower but limited in number
 - Regulators and regulations should focus on the most important issues
 - Blend updated Prescription based standards with Performance style regulation
 - Clearly define needed safety barriers and assign required performance and ownership
 - Regulator should ensure the competence of those doing inspections not attempt all itself
 - Combine safety & environmental regulation
- Capture this in a Safety Case-style Regulatory Regime
 - Operator <u>demonstrates</u> the high level of safety that will be achieved <u>and</u> maintained and that all key barriers are functioning at their required performance level
 - Independent verification of people, process and plant barriers
 - Cover both safety AND environment



2. Address Technical, Human and Organizational Factors

- This lesson has been clearly learned from many past disasters
 - Esso Longford Fire / Texas City Explosion / Three Mile Island / NASA Challenger
- Purely technical solutions do not address all important failure modes particularly in people & business process areas
- A step change will require all three aspects: Technical, Human and Organizational





Improve technology qualification and interface handling

- New technology need to be systematically qualified the specific environment and operational scenarios where it will be applied.
- Interfaces between systems and operations need to handled in a systematic manner and be part of the qualification process.
- Ensure that existing known technology applied outside present area of experience is qualified for the new application areas.




BOP, Deep Wather Horizon (US. Coast Guard)



3. Fully Integrated Risk Model

- A fully integrated tool for
 - Designing for exemplary safety AND environmental performance
 - Operating for exemplary safety AND environmental performance
- Allowing for full communication between Operator, Contractor and Regulator
 - Equivalent focus on the Risk the Controls – and the Condition
 - Transparent demonstration that safety is substantially enhanced
- Consider the use of approved, standardised tools which have been well validated






Macondoutblåsningen i et Regelverksperspektiv 2011-04-01 © Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.

4. Clear Operational Roles and Responsibilities


- Offshore operations involve many parties
 - Owner, operator, contractors, independent 3rd parties
- The Operator owns the overall risk and the Safety case
 - The regulator may "accept" a safety case, but does not usually "approve" it
- Bow Tie risk model clearly identifies responsibilities for maintaining barriers at specified performance level





5. Shared Performance Monitoring and Decision Making

- The best risk model is still only theory if it isn't implemented
 - Technical, human and organizational means are needed to keep it REAL
 - The status of all barriers must be continuously monitored and shared with all who need to know. Teamwork should be employed for key decisions
 - Operator, Contractors, 3rd parties, regulator, and Offshore and Onshore locations
 - Decision rooms (IO) to address unusual situations or combinations of functional and degraded barriers



Macondoutblåsningen i et Regelverksperspektiv 2011-04-01 © Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.



Some major changes in the regulations 1/2


- US
 - MMS broken up into three separate divisions, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEMRE), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue,
 - BOEMRE is responsible for inspection and oversight of energy companies to ensure they are following the law and protecting the safety of their workers and the environment.
 - BOP re-certification
 - Drilling and completion plans to be reviewed by an independent professional engineer
 - Safety case on drilling rigs.
 - Development of management system requirements are under development.
- EU are looking into the need for establish safety standards in order to Facing the challenge of the safety of offshore oil and Gas Activities
- NSOAF (North Sea Offshore Authorities' Forum) are looking into potential weaknesses related to well control, well design and drilling systems.





Some major changes in the regulations 2/2

- Norway
 - Improvements in the organisation of the oil spill prevention and methods used
 - Continued follow up of offshore safety performance
 - No major changes in Norway related to drilling and well regulations
 - Encouraging industry to improve industry standards related to drilling and well
 - Follow closely up how the industry is able to learn from the last years incidents.






Industry initiatives

- Major Oil and Gas Operators have been updating their operational procedures after the Macondo incident.
- International Organisation for Oil and Gas Producer (OGP) and Oil and Gas UK are addressing the issue.
- ISO standard on Well Integrity is being developed
- OLF, The Norwegian Oil Industry Association has a task group which has given recommendation to improvements in industry best practices:
 - Update NORSOK D010 Well Integrity, well design, cementing, barrier testing, BOP emergency function testing
 - Update NORSOK D001 Drilling systems
 - Competence and training
 - Establish national cooperation on oil spill prevention and improved methods
 - Coordinated management of incidents



Conclusion

- The Vision Step Change improvement for Safety and Environment
- Systematic qualification of technology and interface handling
- Improved integrated framework for risk management





Safeguarding life, property and the environment

www.dnv.com



MANAGING RISK