


#### **Statnett**

Utfordringer av forsyningssikkerheten ved økt cybertrussel

Lars Erik Smevold (Statnett / KraftCERT) John Eidar Simensen (Inst. For Energiteknikk)

> ESRA Seminar 1 Sept. 2021



# IFE Digital Systems

From sensors to decisions

#### Departments:

- Control Room & Interaction Design
- Virtual & Augmented Reality
- Applied Data Science
- Humans & Automation
- Human Centered Digitalization
- Risk, Safety, & Security
- Applied Nuclear Science

#### Spinoffs since 2000:







International projects > 72% > 150 ongoing projects





#### **11 Laboratories**

- HAMMLAB Human-Machine Lab
- HVRC VR/AR lab
- Future lab
- Human-Centred Sensing lab
- Digitalization lab
- Sensor & Mechatronic lab
- 4 Decommissioning labs
- HADRON Robotics lab (under construction)

#### 2 Centres:

- Cybersecurity Centre
- IAEA Nuclear Decommissioning Centre

#### IFE Cybersecurity Centre



Cyber center serves and supports projects comprising (e.g.):



#### Capabilities:

• Fully customizable environment

- Full freedom physical and virtual servers and machines
- Customizable network
  infrastructure
- Enclaves for customer equipment
- Possibility for onsite access
- Secure remote access
- Technical and operational scalability

#### What we do:

- Assessments and testing
- Simulation and modelling
- Incident detection and response
- Awareness and training

IFE

#### **CybWin Project**

Cybersecurity Platform for Assessment and Training for Critical Infrastructures – Legacy to Digital Twin 5 IFE

Norwegian research council project

Project timeline 2019-2022

Total budget: 28 million Norwegian kroner



### CybWin – domains and use cases

- CybWin's three different domains; nuclear, aviation and power grid/supply comprise different:
  - systems and critical infrastructure, different procedures and processes, different people, knowledge, culture, ...
  - all of which relates against the respective domains' threat picture




# Threat Landscape of Power Grid Substations

Lars Erik Smevold, KraftCERT Siv Hilde Houmb, Statnett SF



#### This is Statnett

- Statnett is the system operator of the Norwegian power system.
- Statnett operates around 11,000 km of highvoltage power lines, 166 substations and 1,400 km of subsea and land cables across Norway.
- The National and Regional Control Centres continuously monitor the grid to ensure stable power supply.
- Statnett is also responsible for interconnectors to Sweden, Finland, Russia, Denmark and the Netherlands.




- Initative from NCSC.no and The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate.
- Independent, non-profit corporation.

KraftCERT/InfraCERT

• Part of the national response function for sectors.

Norwegian Energy Sector and Control System CERT

- Industrial Control Systems
  - Electrical, Oil&Gas, Process, Water&Waste and other ICS related industry.
- Owners: Statnett(TSO), Statkraft(Generation) and Elvia(DSO).











ERT


### **Digitalization of Power Lines**






## **Digital Substation**

Digital substations replace many point-to-point copper cables with a single fiber-optic process bus.





\*The digital process bus is managed by the IEC 61850-2 subsection of the standard for digital substation communication. It underpins the true digital substation and requires a new approach to substation architecture, design and construction.

https://www.windpowerengineering.com/going-digital-look-modern-substation/

# **Smart Grid - Digitalization**




- Substations:
  - Digitalization all the way out to the switchyard (fiber and IP).
  - Instrumentation and data gathering in substations.
  - From box/hardware to functions (software).
  - Multiple functions in one box (IED).
  - Cloud services.
- Power lines:
  - Sensors and IIoT devices on power lines.
  - Cloud services.

Huge increase in the amount of data gathered for various types of analysis, but also to support operations and management of the grid.





### **Anything to Worry About?**







### Attackers and their Capabilities

Security Level	Target	Skills	Motivation	Means	Resources
SL4	Nation State, Contractors				
		ICS Specific	High	Sophisticated (Campa ign)	Extended (Multidiscipli nary Teams)
SL3	Hacktivist, Terrorist	ICS Specific	Moderate	Sophisticated (Attack)	Moderate (Hacker Group)
SL2	Cybercrime, Hacker	Generic	Low	Simple	Low (Isolated Individual)
SL1	Casual or coincidental violations	No Attack Skills	Mistakes	Non intentional	Based on IE Individual

#### Statnett CERT

# **Threat Picture**

- Random infections have led to profiling, which can lead to targeted attacks.
- ICS is a major asset for the attackers:
  - Malware can have ICS functionality.
  - Attack on Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS).
  - Supply chain attacks.
  - ...

Low hanging fruit 's are still important for an attacker.



# **Cybersecurity Standards of Relevance**

- **IEC 62443** is the leading standard within cybersecurity for control and automation systems.
  - IEC 62443 covers all aspects of cybersecurity for IACS (organization, system, component).
- IEC 62351 defines security controls for power grid communication, such as IEC 104 and IEC 61850.
  - Scope is securing communication.
  - Covers encryption, certificates, PKI, RBAC.





FRT

## The practical approach in CybWin R&D

The theory needs support from practice. More valuable insight and knowledge. As close to real time systems as possible.

Attackers view vs Defenders view.

- Systematic approach based on real attacks.
- The possibilities of other attack vectors
- Enhance our incident response and defending perspectives.
- Human factors when an incident occurs.
  - Human behavior in an ICS environment during Cyber incident.
  - Practical solutions/how to playbooks, procedures, processes...



# **Need to Move from This – Perimeters**

+

And Build Security Based on a New Reality

#### The Future is Electric

#### Statnett